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ABSTRACT 
 
I investigate the impact of geography on corporate financial reporting.  Specifically, I 
predict and document that both the availability of accounting and business expertise and the 
resulting knowledge transfers in a location influence the financial reporting attributes of public 
companies headquartered in that location.  The nature of this impact is moderated by auditor 
attributes.  I further investigate whether local knowledge transfers can contribute to the spread of 
inappropriate accounting practices and document strong local effects in the incidence of 
backdating-related restatements.  These impacts of location on financial reporting are novel and 
incremental to effects reported in prior studies.  
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
A key goal of financial reporting is to ensure that financial statements represent faithfully 
the underlying economic reality of the reporting entity.  Developing such representations calls 
for a deep understanding of the entity’s business practices and of accounting and auditing 
principles and pronouncements (hereafter, expertise) by both preparers and auditors of financial 
statements.1  Geographic variation in the availability of expertise as well as the resulting 
knowledge transfers among experts can be expected to induce concomitant geographical 
variation in corporate financial reporting (CFR).  Moreover, differences in audit firms’ ability to 
orchestrate organizational arrangements that overcome the disadvantages of spatial dispersion 
and to absorb knowledge transfers can be expected to moderate the impact of local variations in 
expertise on CFR.  On a more cautionary note, local knowledge transfers that facilitate 
convergence of expert judgments also can, under certain circumstances, contribute to the 
diffusion of inappropriate accounting practices.2  By systematically incorporating into the 
analyses measures of variation in expertise across locations (a theoretically important, but 
heretofore unexamined set of factors), my study contributes to a fuller understanding of the 
determinants of CFR.     
I measure the influence of preparer and auditor expertise on CFR by the extent to which a 
company’s financial reports conform to industry norms (financial reporting consistency, FRC).  
The theoretical justification for such a mapping stems from Einhorn’s (1974) argument that 
                                               
1Managers (i.e. preparers) are responsible for generating financial statements while auditors provide assurance that 
the representations made in those statements comply with GAAP.  
2
 In addition to highlighting a possible negative effect of local knowledge transfers, documenting local concentration 
of inappropriate accounting practices serves an important methodological purpose.  Since location is a choice 
variable (i.e., is endogenous), an observed association between the CFR of a company and its neighbors may stem 
from a host of unobservable factors that influence location choice rather than from knowledge transfers per se.  
However, there are few, if any, explanations other than local knowledge transfers for local concentration of 
inappropriate accounting practices. 
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consistency of judgment is a hallmark of expertise: when faced with similar problems, experts 
are more likely than non-experts to recommend similar solutions (in my setting, similar 
accounting treatments for similar business transactions).  Empirically, I use the absolute value of 
a company’s performance-adjusted Jones-model abnormal accruals (Jones 1991; Kothari et al. 
2005) as my principal surrogate for FRC.  Conceptually, this measure represents the 
idiosyncratic component of a company’s accruals, i.e., the extent to which a company’s reported 
accruals differ from industry norms (Francis et al. 2006) with larger abnormal accruals 
indicating lower FRC. 
I use instances of backdating of employee stock option grants to study the diffusion of 
inappropriate accounting practices.  Backdating involves falsely recording in-the-money 
employee stock option grants as at-the-money grants and violates a variety of securities and tax 
laws and regulations.  The patently inappropriate nature of this practice makes it an ideal 
candidate for examining the potential downside (costs) of local knowledge transfers among 
preparers and/or their advisors since there are few, if any, competing explanations for local 
concentration of such inappropriate practices.       
I use metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) as defined by the Office of Management and 
Budgets as the geographic unit of analysis.  My measure of the local availability of expertise is 
the within-industry count of company headquarters located in an MSA.  In sensitivity analyses 
(see Chapter 5 for details), I confirm that using alternative measures of consistency or of key test 
variables does not materially alter my principal findings.     
My empirical analyses address three research questions.  First, does the impact of the 
local availability of expertise on CFR vary with auditor size?  Second, does the impact of local 
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knowledge transfers on CFR vary with auditor size?  Third, do local knowledge transfers 
increase the likelihood of a company adopting inappropriate accounting practices? 
My principal findings are as follows.  With respect to the first research question, I find 
that the impact of local availability of expertise on FRC varies with auditor size: Big Four 
auditee FRC is unaffected by location while non Big Four auditee FRC improves with the local 
availability of expertise.3  With respect to the second research question, I find that the impact of 
local knowledge transfers varies with auditor size: Big Four auditee FRC increases with neighbor 
company FRC while non Big Four auditee FRC displays no such pattern.  With respect to the 
third research question, I find that the likelihood of backdating increases with the proportion of 
other neighbor companies adopting that practice, indicating that local knowledge transfers can 
sometimes lead to the diffusion of inappropriate practices.  
 My dissertation contributes to the literature in several respects.  First, prior research in 
economics and finance suggests that location influences innovation (e.g. Jaffe et al. 2000) and 
investment decisions (e.g. Coval and Moskowitz 2001, Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2005, 2007; 
Brown et. al 2008).  In this study, I show that location influences choices even in a highly 
regulated domain of activity such as financial reporting.  Second, prior researchers have reported 
that larger firms are better able than smaller firms to (1) compensate for the disadvantages of 
location and (2) benefit from local knowledge transfers.  I exploit the considerable difference in 
size between the four large audit firms and the rest of the audit industry to present novel large-
scale empirical evidence on this proposition.  Third, my finding that Big Four auditors are able to 
compensate for the local availability of expertise and benefit from local knowledge transfers 
highlights a benefit of large audit firm networks.  Fourth, my finding that local knowledge 
                                               
3
 I use the terms auditor and firm interchangeably to refer to public accounting firms. I refer to Deloitte LLP, Ernst 
and Young LLP, KPMG LLP and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP collectively as the Big Four auditors and to all 
other auditors as non-Bi-Four auditors. I use the terms auditee, client, or company to refer to the public companies. 
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transfers can result in localized adoption of inappropriate accounting practices is of potential 
interest to corporate managers, policy makers, regulators, financial statement users and other 
audit market participants interested in detecting and constraining such practices.  Fifth, my study 
highlights the importance of including location characteristics as control variables in studies that 
investigate determinants of CFR especially in studies that examine the influence of local market 
factors on CFR. 
I organize the remainder of this dissertation as follows.  In Chapter 2, I review prior 
related research and develop my principal research questions.  In Chapter 3, I discuss sample 
selection, and in Chapter 4, I discuss research methods.  I report results in Chapter 5 and present 
concluding remarks in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRIOR RESEARCH, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS 
2.1 Availability of Expertise, Knowledge Transfers, and Financial Reporting Consistency 
Managers (i.e. preparers) are responsible for preparing financial statements in accordance 
with applicable accounting pronouncements (GAAP).  Auditors examine the veracity of these 
assertions and as warranted provide assurance that the financial statements comply with GAAP.  
Representing complex business transactions using the appropriate GAAP requires a great deal of 
expertise on the part of both the preparer and the auditor.  Prior literature argues that for a variety 
of reasons experts physically co-locate i.e. agglomerate and as a result the availability of 
expertise is not uniform across locations.4  It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that those 
attributes of CFR that are influenced by preparer and auditor expertise will vary systematically 
with location.    
In addition to the availability of expertise in an area, I expect local knowledge transfers 
that inevitably result from agglomeration of experts to affect CFR.  Tacit knowledge is an 
important determinant of accounting and business expertise (Tan and Libby 1997, Marchant and 
Robinson 1999, Vera Munoz et al. 2006, Kedia and Rajagopal 2009).  Prior research (e.g. 
Polanyi 1958; Desrochers 2001; Morgan 2004) suggests that close face-to-face interaction is 
especially necessary for the transmission of tacit knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is difficult to 
codify and is learned through close interaction and experience.  Unlike experts located in 
geographically distant locations, experts located in the same area enjoy multiple opportunities to 
                                               
4
 For instance, Krugman (1991) argues that labor market frictions can lead experts to agglomerate in geographical 
locations: they can more readily expect to find alternative employment in larger agglomerations, minimizing the 
impact of employment shocks on their human capital.  Related, Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) argue that by 
locating in large agglomerations employers can credibly commit to paying competitive wages, reducing employee 
concerns about hold-up problems and encouraging them to develop industry-specific expertise. 
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meet and interact with other experts.  For instance, accountants and auditors are likely to be 
members of industry and professional organizations that provide various local functions (e.g. 
meetings, seminars, symposiums, etc) in which their members can get together and exchange 
ideas.  Experts in a location also are likely to frequent the same social and recreational facilities 
which provides then with another opportunity to interact and share knowledge.  In addition, 
companies headquartered in the same area are more likely to share directors, consultants, and/or 
auditors, facilitating information transfers between neighboring companies.  To the extent that 
such local knowledge transfers influence financial reporting choices, I expect that attributes of 
CFR that, in turn,  are influenced by preparer and auditor expertise will be positively associated 
with similar attributes of other companies in its location.  
Einhorn (1974) suggests that inter-expert consistency of judgment, i.e., agreement among 
experts is a necessary condition for expertise.  He argues that experts should weight and combine 
information in similar ways so that when faced with similar problems, they should suggest 
similar solutions.  Adopting this line of reasoning, I, therefore, expect accounting and business 
experts, irrespective of their location, to propose similar approaches to account for similar 
business transactions and the consensus of opinion among these experts to constitute the industry 
norm.  To the extent that expertise affects CFR, I expect greater expertise to increase the 
consistency of a company’s accounting choices with industry norms, i.e., to increase FRC.   
My principal measure of FRC is the inverse of the company’s performance-adjusted 
Jones-model abnormal accruals (Jones 1991; Kothari et al. 2005).  Mechanically, Jones model 
abnormal accruals are residuals from industry-year regressions (see Section 4.3.1), i.e., the extent 
to which a company’s total accruals deviate from industry norms.  Accordingly, I interpret larger 
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deviations as indicators of lower consistency with industry norms, i.e., of lower FRC.5  To check 
the robustness of my findings, I also examine several alternative computations of abnormal 
accruals and obtain materially identical results (see Section 5.5 for details). 
2.2 The Mediating Role of Large Audit Firms on Corporate FRC  
Prior research suggests that large organizations are capable of leveraging their geographic 
networks to compensate for the relative shortage of experts in some locations.  Specifically, 
larger firms can effectively substitute organizational proximity for spatial proximity by fostering 
a sense of organizational identity (logic-of-belonging) and via common work procedures and 
practices (logic-of-similarity), enabling their members to effectively exchange ideas at a spatial 
remove (Torre and Rallet 2005; Gertler 2005; Knoben and Oerlemans 2006).   
In the auditing domain, I conjecture that the vastly larger scale of operations of the Big 
Four auditors enables them to more effectively substitute organizational proximity for spatial 
proximity.  Their nation-wide (and global) network of offices permits Big Four auditors to draw 
on a much broader set of experts, including industry-specific expertise that may only be available 
in certain locations.  Their larger scale also makes it more cost-effective for these firms to invest 
in national training sessions, standardized work procedures and quality control activities as well 
as inter-office personnel exchanges (travel, transfers, rotations, secondment of specialists etc.) 
that promote familiarity and facilitate effective exchange of knowledge among their employees.  
The non Big Four auditors have considerably smaller and far more geographically concentrated 
practices which preclude them from enjoying the scale economies necessary to replicate these 
                                               
5
 Francis et al. (2006), among others, point out that abnormal accruals models fail to control for many company 
characteristics that can impact accruals. I address this issue by including in model (1) an extensive set of company 
level variables (e.g. CFO, CH_SALE) to control for these factors.  As noted earlier, my analysis of the geographical 
incidence of inappropriate accounting practices (see Section 2.3 and 5.4 for details) further addresses the potential 
endogeneity problems stemming from the presence of these unobserved corporate fundamentals.       
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arrangements.6  For these reasons, I expect that, compared to the non Big Four auditors, Big Four 
auditors will be better able to compensate for local variations in the availability of expertise and, 
thus, to produce more uniform auditee FRC across locations.   
 In addition to their greater ability to compensate for the local availability of expertise, I 
expect the effects of local knowledge transfers to be greater for Big Four auditors than for non 
Big Four auditors.  Research on knowledge transfers in agglomerations suggests that the size of 
local networks and absorptive capacity of its members play an important role in effective transfer 
and adoption of new knowledge within agglomerations (e.g. Agarwal 2002; Audretsch and 
Feldman 2003).  Larger local networks enable members to interact more frequently and 
extensively with other members of the agglomeration while greater absorptive capacity enables 
them to identify, assimilate and apply new knowledge more effectively.  In the context of the 
audit markets, the Big Four auditors have the brand recognition and economic resources to hire 
the best talent and provide them access to most social and professional networks in a location.  
Hence, when compared with the non Big Four auditors, the Big Four auditors can be expected to 
be more open to knowledge transfers within agglomerations. 
2.3 Inappropriate Accounting Practice- Backdating of Stock Option Grants 
 An inappropriate accounting practice may originate as a result of (1) an unintentional 
error on the part of the preparer and auditor in the application of GAAP or (2) preparers adopting 
a particularly aggressive interpretation of GAAP to meet certain financial reporting objectives 
and their auditors failing to curb such aggressive reporting.  Aggressive accounting practices are 
unlikely to be publicly disclosed (e.g. out of concerns for regulatory or market disciplinary 
                                               
6
 For instance  for fiscal year 2005, in the merged Compustat-CompactD-Audit Analytics sample, the Big Four firms, 
on average, had offices in 147 different MSAs each. The next four largest audit firms after the Big Four (i.e. Grant 
Thronton LLP, BDO Seidman LLP, Crowe Chizek and Company LLC, and McGladrey and Pullen LLP) on average 
operated out of 54 MSAs each and the remaining firms operated out of 2.5 MSAs each. 
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consequences, should they become public) and are more likely to be disseminated via private 
interactions among preparers and their advisors (e.g., common board memberships or advisory 
relationship).  As these practices become more common in a location, the likelihood of 
accounting contagion increases, i.e., there is an elevated likelihood that other preparers and 
advisors will interact with and be influenced by the earlier adopters.  I, therefore, predict that the 
likelihood of a company adopting an inappropriate accounting practice increases as more of its 
neighbors adopt that practice.  
The inappropriate accounting practice that I study is the backdating of stock option 
grants.  Backdating of stock option grants involves accounting for in-the-money employee stock 
option grants as if they were issued as at-the-money grants made at an earlier date (when the 
actual stock price was equal to the exercise price).  Backdating requires the fabrication of 
supporting documents to permit employers to falsely qualify for favorable accounting and tax 
treatments otherwise applicable only to at-the-money grants.  If discovered, backdating can 
trigger potentially severe and adverse accounting and tax consequences for the companies 
involved.  First, companies that backdate in-the-money grants to mimic at-the-money grants 
under-report compensation expense under GAAP and may have to restate their financial 
statements.  Second, companies that backdate face potential liabilities under Internal Revenue 
Code sections 162(m) and 409A as well as additional payroll tax liabilities.  
Collectively, the fact that undisclosed backdating is unambiguously and patently 
erroneous accounting (involving the creation of false documents and misreporting of expenses 
and income) and that it is successful only if it is undisclosed, make backdating particularly well-
suited to study the role of local knowledge transfers on diffusion of inappropriate accounting 
practices.  Both factors make localized concentration of undisclosed backdating more likely the 
 10 
result of private interactions between preparers and advisors who are already involved in the 
practice and those that might consider adopting it, rather than of local availability of expertise or 
other confounding factors.  Consequently, studying the local adoption of backdating practices 
can shed valuable insights into the important of local knowledge transfers in the accounting 
domain. 
Another feature of the backdating analyses is that it is most likely to reflect knowledge 
transfers among managers.  This is true because auditors are unlikely to have paid close attention 
to employee stock options because stock options were not expensed in the financial statements 
and the auditors may not have had any reason to suspect the veracity of the paper work provided 
by the preparers to support the stock option compensation expenses.  
2.4 Research Questions  
Since I posit that auditor size moderates the impact of both the availability of expertise 
and local knowledge transfers, two of my three research questions are best posited as questions 
about conditional effects (“Is the impact of x on CFR different for auditees of Big Four and non 
Big Four firms?”).  The third research question is not similarly phrased because a paucity of 
observations precludes me from testing the diffusion of inappropriate practices separately for Big 
Four and non Big Four auditees: 
RQ1: Is Big Four auditee FRC less sensitive to the local availability of expertise than 
non Big Four auditee FRC?   
RQ2: Does Big Four auditee FRC display a greater positive association with neighbor 
company FRC than does non Big Four auditee FRC? 
RQ3: Does the likelihood that a company will adopt an inappropriate accounting practice 
increase with the proportion of its neighbors adopting that practice? 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
I obtain corporate financial statement data from the Compustat Fundamentals Annual 
(Compustat) database.  Compustat reports only the current corporate headquarters location (city, 
county, state). 7  I, therefore, use the Compact Disclosure (CompactD) database to identify 
historical data on company headquarters location (city and state) (Coval and Moskowitz 2001; 
Malloy C. J. 2005; Pirinsky and Wang 2006).8  I obtain auditor location (street, city and state of 
the signing auditor) and audit fee data from the Audit Analytics Audit Opinions and Audit Fee 
databases respectively.9 
   My geographic unit of analysis is the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Neither 
CompactD nor Audit Analytics provide MSA information for corporate headquarters or auditor 
locations.  I use a two-step process to identify this information.  First, using the SAS file 
SASHELP.ZIPCODE, I identify the county in which the corporate headquarters city and the 
auditor’s city office is located.10  I then map these counties into MSAs using the U.S. Census 
Bureau Annual MSA definition files.11  
I obtain annual MSA and national level employment data, used to compute MSA size and 
MSA level supply of accounting expertise (both control variables), from the County Business 
                                               
7
 For example, Boeing moved its corporate headquarters from Seattle, WA to Chicago, IL in 2003.  In 2010, 
Compustat reports Chicago, IL as Boeing’s headquarters for all years for which data are available.   
8
 Compact Disclosure was published monthly till June 2006. I use the June issue of each year to obtain the 
headquarters location for each company-year.     
9
 The Audit Analytics database also has data on the location of company headquarters but, as with Compustat, Audit 
Analytics provides only corporate headquarters location as of the latest financial statement date. 
10
 SASHELP.ZIPCODE (a SAS installation file) provides County, State, ZIP and Centriods for many cities.  For 
others, I obtain county information from the National Association of Counties website, http://www.naco.org/. 
11
 MSA definition files are available annually beginning June 2003. For the years between 1993 and 2003 MSA 
definition files are available as on June 30, 1993 and June 30, 1999.  These files are obtained from 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/metroareas/metrodef.html .   
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Patterns (CBP) data of the U.S. Census Bureau.12  Audit Analytics data  are available for 
company fiscal years after 2000 while CompactD is not available after July 2006, and so my data 
span the fiscal years 2000 to 2005 (both inclusive). 13  Since I require three years of lagged data 
to calculate auditor tenure and company age variables I restrict my analyses to fiscal years 2003, 
2004 and 2005 (see Appendix A for data sources).  To enhance inferential validity, I also impose 
the following restrictions:  
a) To minimize confounds stemming from international variations in institutions, 
legal and regulatory systems, enforcement levels and other business practices, I exclude 
from my analyses companies headquartered outside of  the United States,14   
b) To minimize inferential confounds stemming from auditors and auditees 
benefiting differentially from knowledge transfers occurring in their separate  locations, I 
exclude all cases in which a company  and its auditor are located in different MSAs,  
c) To minimize confounds stemming from the use of inappropriate accrual models, I 
exclude companies belonging to regulated (SIC 4000-4999) and financial (SIC 6000-
6999) industries.15  
My final sample, therefore, consists of 4,803 observations (1,988 distinct companies) all 
having the necessary data and meeting my sample criteria.  Table 1 provides details of the loss of 
observations from applying the above restrictions.  
I identify backdating-related restatements by searching the Audit Analytics database for 
restatements classified as “Deferred, stock-based compensation backdating only (subcategory).”  
                                               
12
 Annual business and financial services employment data at MSA and national levels are available as  zip files 
from the Census Bureau website http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/download/index.htm.   
13
 The SEC required public companies to disclose audit and non-audit fees paid to their outside auditors in proxy 
statements filed after February 5, 2001 (SEC Final Rule S7-13-00).   
14
 I do, however, include companies incorporated outside, but headquartered in the United States.  
15
 The accrual structure for financial companies is qualitatively different from that of the others companies (e.g. 
Richardson et al. 2005; Francis and Yu 2009).    
 13 
In addition to the 138 U.S. headquartered companies with such restatements in fiscal year 2005, I 
identify five more companies with such restatements for fiscal year 2005 from the Wall Street 
Journal list of potential backdaters.16  After applying restrictions (a) and (b) above, my final 
sample for the backdating-related tests consists of 1,845 observations (1,845 companies).17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
16
 The Wall Street Journal list of potential backdaters is available at the following website 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html . 
17
 I choose fiscal year 2005 data for these tests because (a) most restatements were filed for this period and 
(b)company and auditor location data are available for this period.  I get qualitatively similar results using 2004 data.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this section, I discuss, in order, the choice of the geographic and industrial unit of analyses 
and the estimation models I use.   
4.1 Geographic Unit of Analyses 
 MSAs are, by definition, socially and economically integrated geographic units.  They 
are widely regarded as the appropriate unit of analysis for the study of professional and social 
interactions that facilitate knowledge spillovers (Glaeser et al. 1992) because they are both large 
enough to be economically meaningful (i.e., each MSA hosts a sufficiently large number of 
headquarters) and numerous enough to permit meaningful statistical analysis. 
4.2 Industry Unit of Analyses 
  My industry unit of analysis is the 2-digit SIC code.  This choice is motivated by three 
principal considerations: (1) it is sufficiently narrow to ensure both within-group commonality 
and between-group diversity in economic activity, (2) it is sufficiently broad to ensure that there 
are an adequate number of companies in each group to permit meaningful statistical analysis, and 
(3) it is the most commonly used industry classification in accounting research and therefore 
permits meaningful comparison of the results of this study to those of prior studies.  
4.3 Model Specification: Financial Reporting Consistency - Abnormal Accrual  
To investigate whether the impact of location on absolute abnormal accruals (my measure 
of FRC) is moderated by auditor size, I estimate the following model separately for Big Four and 
non Big Four auditees and test whether the coefficients on the test variables are significantly 
different between the two groups18   
                                               
18
 An alternate estimation approach would be to specify a fully nested model (a model that interacts an indicator 
variable for Big Four auditees with all other variables). Such a specification results in severe multicollinearity 
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ABS_ACC = β0 + β1LHQ + β2MEAN_ACC + β3LMSA + β4LACCY + β5LDIST + 
β6HHI_MSA + β7 LFEESZ + β8INFL + β9AUD_NEW + β10MSA_LEAD + β11NEW + 
β12MSA_NEW + β13LAT + β14CH_SALE + β15LOSS + β16LEV + β17CFO + industry fixed 
effects + year fixed effects + ε                                                                (1) 
where the dependent and test variables are defined as follows: 
ABS_ACC (the dependent variable) is the absolute value of company-specific 
discretionary accruals estimated using the performance adjusted modified 
Jones model;19 
LHQ (the test variable for availability effects) is the natural logarithm of total 
number of headquarters in each 2-digit SIC industry in each MSA; 
MEAN_ACC (the test variable for local knowledge transfer effects) is the mean absolute 
abnormal accrual (i.e. mean ABS_ACC) for all other companies located in 
the MSA excluding the company in question; 
and the control variables are defined as follows: 
LMSA is the natural logarithm of total employment in the MSA; 
LACCY is the natural logarithm of total employment in NAICS 5412 (Accounting, 
Tax Preparation, Bookkeeping, and Payroll Services) in each MSA; 
LDIST is the natural logarithm of the distance, in miles, between the MSA where 
the company is headquartered and the nearest SEC office; 20 
HHI_MSA is the Herfindahl index (a measure of market concentration) for the audit 
market at the MSA level. It is computed as ∑
=
N
i
is
1
2
 where si is the market 
share of firm i and N is the number of firms in the market; 
BIG  is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the company is audited by 
a Big Four auditor and 0, otherwise; 
LFEE_SZ   is the natural logarithm of total fees earned by each audit office; 
INFL is the ratio of the total fees paid by the auditee to the total fees collected 
from all its auditees by the office that audits this auditee; 
AUD_NEW  takes the value 1 if the tenure of the auditor is less than or equal to three 
years and 0 otherwise; 
MSA_LEAD takes the value 1 if the auditor has the highest market share by auditee fees 
for that industry in that MSA, 0 otherwise;  
                                                                                                                                                       
among regressors, precluding any meaningful inferences.  I therefore rely on cross-equation Wald tests to examine 
differences in coefficient estimates.  
19
 See section 4.3.1 for model details. 
20
 I use the Stata ado file globdist.ado authored by Simons (2007) to calculate the distance between locations. I use 
the SEC offices located in Washington DC and   the regional offices located in Boston, MA; New York, NY; 
Philadelphia, PA; Chicago, IL; Salt lake City, UT; San Francisco, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Denver, CO; Atlanta, GA; 
Miami, FL and Fort Worth, TX as reference points for the computations. 
 16 
NEW  takes the value 1 if the company has appeared in the Compustat database 
for less than 4 years, 0 otherwise; 
MSA_NEW takes the value 1 if the company has been located in an MSA for three 
years or less, 0 otherwise 
LAT   is the natural logarithm of company total assets; 
CH_SALE   is the change in company sales computed as (Salest-Salest-1/Salest-1); 
LOSS  takes the value 1 if net income for the company is less than 0 and 0 
otherwise; 
LEV    is the ratio of the company’s total liabilities to its total assets; 
CFO  is the cash flow from operations for the company. 
 
  The model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with industry and year fixed 
effects and standard errors clustered by MSA.  The industry and year fixed effects control for 
observable and unobservable time-invariant industry characteristics or year effects while the 
clustered standard errors correct for intra-MSA correlations (Rogers 1993, Petersen 2008).  For 
brevity, I discuss below the motivation for (and computation of) the dependent variable, the two 
test variables and, since these variables are new to this study, the two MSA level control 
variables and relegate analogous discussion of the other control variables to Appendix B.   
4.3.1 Dependent Variable  
As noted earlier, my primary measure of FRC is the magnitude of performance adjusted 
Jones model abnormal accruals (Jones 1991; Kothari et al. 2005).  I compute these accruals as 
the residual from the following regression model estimated separately by industry and year:  
TAit = β0 + β1 (1/ASSETit-1) + β2∆SALESit + β3PPEit + β4ROAit + εit                        (2) 
where TA is total accruals, computed as net income (Compustat# 172, NI) less operating cash 
flows (Compustat# 308, OANCF) (Hribar and Collins 2002).  ASSET is total assets (Compustat# 
6, AT).  ∆SALES is the changes in net sales (Compustat# 12, SALE less lagged Compustat# 12, 
SALE), PPE is net property, plant and equipment (Compustat# 8, PPENT) and ROA is net 
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income before extraordinary items (Compustat# 18, IB). Variables TA, ∆SALES, PPE, and ROA 
are scaled by lagged total assets. 
4.3.2 Test Variables  
My first test variable, LHQ, is a proxy for the local availability of experts. I choose to 
model the local availability of expertise at the level of the auditee industry for the following 
reason.  Each industry has its unique business practices that call for industry specific accounting 
policies and require accountants and auditors to specialize by industry.  For instance, prior 
studies in auditing suggest that auditors specialize by industry (e.g. Balsam et al. 2003) and that 
industry specialist auditors naturally develop specific knowledge and skills (e.g. Solomon et al. 
1999).  Thus, FRC is more likely to be influenced by the local availability of business and 
accounting experts who specialize by auditee industry.  I use LHQ, computed as the natural 
logarithm of the total number of auditee industry headquarters (2-digit SIC) in a location to 
proxy for the local availability of auditee industry expertise.  Given that my dependent measure 
is the magnitude of abnormal accruals, and that smaller abnormal accruals indicate higher FRC, I 
expect the coefficients of my measures of the local availability of expertise (LHQ) to be negative 
and significant.  I interpret a significant negative coefficient on LHQ as evidence that the greater 
local availability of expertise increases FRC.    
My second test variable, MEAN_ACC is a proxy for local knowledge transfer effects.  I 
define it as the mean absolute abnormal accrual for all neighboring companies (i.e. other 
companies in a location, excluding the company in question).  I expect the coefficient on 
MEAN_ACC to be positive and significant indicating a positive correlation between the 
abnormal accruals of a company and the abnormal accruals of its neighbors.  In other words, a 
significant positive coefficient on this variable indicates that a company’s accruals are more 
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likely to be closer to the industry norm if its neighbors’ accruals are closer to the industry norm.  
I interpret a significant positive coefficient as evidence of information transfer between 
companies situated in the same location.     
4.3.3 MSA Level Control Variables 
 In this section, I discuss two the MSA level control variables included in model (1) that 
are new to this study.  LMSA is the natural logarithm of the total local employment.  If the 
ability of managers and auditors to produce consistent financial reports depends on the general 
availability of expertise in a location, I expect the FRC of a company to increase with the size of 
the local labor pool (LMSA).  I include a second MSA level control variable, LACCY, computed 
as the natural logarithm of MSA employment in NAICS 5412 (Accounting, Tax Preparation, 
Bookkeeping, and Payroll Services) to account for the influence of the local availability of 
accounting and auditing expertise which could also influence FRC.   
4.4 Model Specification: Inappropriate Accounting Practice – Backdating  
 To investigate whether the likelihood of a company engaging in undisclosed backdating 
increases with the proportion of neighboring companies doing likewise, I estimate the following 
model  pooled for Big Four and non Big Four auditees 21   
BACKDATE = β0 + β1PROP_BACK + β2LHQ + β3LMSA + β4LACCYb + β5LDIST + 
β6HHI_MSA + β7BIG + β8 LFEESZ + β9INFL + β10AT + β11CH_SALE + β12LOSS + 
β13LEV + β14CFO + industry fixed effects + ε    (3) 
where the dependent and test variables are defined as follows 
BACKDATE (the dependent variable) takes the value 1 if the company has restated its 
financial statement for fiscal year 2005 to account correctly for backdated 
stock options;  
                                               
21
 Restatements by non Big Four auditees are too few in number (less than 10% of the sample of backdating-related 
restatements) to permit separate analysis by auditor type.   
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PROP_BACK (test variable 1) is the proportion of companies in an MSA that restated its 
fiscal year 2005 financial statements to correct for stock options 
backdating, excluding the company in question 
and the control variables are defined as in model (1) 
The dependent measure BACKDATE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the company has a backdating related restatement for fiscal year 2005 and 0 otherwise. The test 
variable is PROP_BACK which is computed as the proportion of companies in an MSA that 
restated its fiscal year 2005 financial statements to correct for stock options backdating, 
excluding the company in question.  I predict that local knowledge transfers will increase the 
probability of a company being involved in backdating as a larger proportion of its neighbors are 
involved in backdating, i.e., I predict a positive and significant coefficient for PROP_BACK.   
Among the control variables, the predictions for the variables on the local availability of 
expertise (LHQ, LMSA and LACCY) are ambiguous.  On the one hand greater local availability 
of experts can be expected to reduce the probability that a company would adopt an 
inappropriate accounting practice.  On the other hand greater local availability of experts also 
increases the chances of interactions among experts leading to knowledge transfers and greater 
adoption of accounting innovations including inappropriate innovations.  I discuss the 
predictions with respect to other control variables in Appendix B. I estimate the model for fiscal 
year 2005 as a conditional logistic model with industry fixed effects. 22  Standard errors are 
robust standard errors clustered by industry. 
                                               
22
 Fixed effects logistic models estimated using dummy variables for individuals (industries, in this instance) 
produce biased regression coefficients and incorrect standard errors.  Chamberlain (1980) suggested conditional 
maximum likelihood estimation, in which the likelihood function is reformulated to drop the individual specific 
dummies, as a solution to this problem. See Allison (2005) for a discussion.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 RESULTS 
5.1 Sample Description 
 Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for key variables used in the study.  The following 
points are worthy of note: (1) the mean abnormal accrual for the sample is 7% of total assets, (2) 
the distribution of MSA_SZ is negatively skewed with the mean (2,500,000) being much larger 
than the median (1,900,000).  A logarithmic transformation considerably reduces the 
distributional asymmetry: the mean (median) for LMSA is 14.35 (14.47), (3) the mean value for 
the BIG indicator variable is 0.80 which indicates that 80% of the sample company years are 
audited by Big Four auditors.  Table 3 reports full-sample correlations (both Spearman and 
Pearson) between the dependent variable and the (continuous) independent variables.  Both test 
and control variables display significant inter-correlations.23 
5.2 Regression Analyses - by Auditor Type: Research Questions One and Two 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating model (1) by auditor type.  Columns (1) and (2) 
report results for Big Four auditees and columns (3) and (4) for non Big Four auditees.  The 
coefficient on local availability of industry expertise (LHQ) is not significant in column (1) 
indicating that Big Four auditee FRC is invariant to local availability of industry-specific 
expertise while it is negative and significant (-0.015, p<0.05) in column (3) indicating that non 
Big Four auditee FRC increases with local availability of industry-specific expertise.  This 
finding answers research question one (does the impact of local availability of expertise on FRC 
vary with auditor type?) in the affirmative.  By contrast, the coefficient on local knowledge 
transfers, MEAN_ACC, is positive and significant (0.121, p<0.05) in column (1) indicating that 
                                               
23
 The variance inflation factors (vif) for all models are well below the cut-off of 10 (Kennedy 2008), indicating that 
multicollinearity is a factor in my models. I discuss additional robustness checks as part of my sensitivity analyses 
reported later in this chapter.  
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the Big Four auditee FRC improves with the FRC of neighboring companies while it is non 
significant in column (3) indicating that there are no such impacts on non Big Four auditee FRC.  
This finding answers research question 2 (does the impact of local knowledge transfers vary 
across auditor types) in the affirmative.  The χ2 statistic for a cross-equation Wald test of the 
equality of the coefficients of LHQ reported in columns (1) and (3) is 4.83 (one-tail p-value 0.01) 
while that for the test of equality of the coefficients of MEAN_ACC is 2.12 (one-tail p-value 
0.07) indicating that the inter-group difference in both sets of coefficients is statistically 
significant.  
 Interestingly, neither the MSA-level supply of general business expertise, LMSA, nor 
that of MSA-level accounting expertise discernibly impacts FRC for the Big Four or non Big 
Four auditees.  Collectively, the findings with respect to the two test variables coupled with the 
lack of significance for the two MSA-level control variables supports the argument that industry 
specific rather than general business and accounting expertise is the key driver of FRC.   
With respect to the other controls, distance from SEC, LDIST, significantly impacts only 
Big Four auditee FRC, indicating that proximity to SEC offices increases Big Four auditee FRC 
while local market competition, HHI_MSA, does not discernibly impact FRC for either Big Four 
or non Big Four auditees.  Auditor office size, LFEE_SZ also has a significant impact on Big 
Four auditee FRC, indicating that the Big Four audit office size effect documented in Francis and 
Yu (2009) is incremental to the location effects I document.  Local audit market leadership, 
MSA_LEAD, has no incremental impact on Big Four auditee FRC, but improves FRC for non 
Big Four auditees: the beneficial impact of local audit market leadership appears to be confined 
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to non Big Four auditees.24  The remaining, auditee level, variables are all either significant in 
the expected direction or insignificant throughout Table 4.      
5.3 Backdating Analyses: Research Question Three 
Table 5 provides the industry distribution of these 143 companies with backdating related 
restatements (hereafter, backdaters).  The most salient feature of Table 5 is the notable industry 
concentration of the restatements: two industries, Business Services (2-digit SIC 73) and 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (SIC 36), contributing about 45% of the observations.  
Table 6 provides the distribution of backdaters by MSAs for those MSAs with at least three 
backdaters located therein (a total of 10 MSAs).  The important finding in this table is that 
certain MSAs have relatively high presence of backdaters.  For instance, San Jose-Sunnyvale-
Santa Clara, CA MSA hosts 23% of all backdating companies while it hosts only about 3.45% of 
all company headquarters and 17.14% (6%) of headquarters in 2-digit SIC 36 (73).  Similarly, 
the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA MSA and Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 
MSA hosts a disproportionately large share of the backdaters.  Taken together the findings in 
tables 5 and 6 suggest that, even after controlling for local industry presence, stock options 
backdating was concentrated in certain geographic locations.  
I report the results of estimating model (3) in table 7.  The key finding is that the 
coefficient of PROP_BACK is positive and significant (6.506, p<0.05) which indicates that the 
likelihood of a backdating-related restatement increases with the proportion neighbor company 
backdating-related restatements.  This finding answers research question three (does the 
likelihood of a company adopting inappropriate accounting practice increase with the proportion 
of its neighbors adopting that practice?) in the affirmative.  The coefficients on the variables for 
                                               
24
 To the best of my knowledge this finding is novel since prior studies do not examine separately by auditor type 
the effects of audit market leadership on CFR attributes. 
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the local availability of expertise (LHQ, LMSA or LACCY) are not significant suggesting that 
the local availability of expertise does not impact the probability of a company restating their 
financial statements to correct for backdating.25  Among the other control variables only size 
(LAT -0.043, p<0.10) and cash flow from operations (CFO1.423, p<0.10) are significant 
indicating that larger companies are less likely to restate their financial statements in connection 
with stock options backdating and companies with higher cash flows from operations are more 
likely to restate financial their financial statements to rectify backdating related errors.26  
Overall, the results of the backdating analyses provide stronger evidence of local 
knowledge transfer effects.  However, these results also provide cautionary evidence that while 
local knowledge transfers can help promote consistency in accounting practices such 
convergence may not always be beneficial (i.e. the practice on which one converges may not 
always be appropriate).  
5.4 Sensitivity Analyses 
Establishing causality is a central challenge in studies that involve location choices 
(Manski 1993).  As noted earlier, the analysis of backdating-related restatements serves as a 
check that the effects I document are not merely artifacts of uncontrolled-for endogeneity.27  In 
                                               
25
 Recall that unlike the accrual analyses where I use LHQ as a test variable, in the backdating analyses I use LHQ  
as a control variable and I do not make any specific predictions about how it would impact the likelihood of 
backdating related restatements.  
26
 Prior research suggests that companies with better corporate governance are less likely to backdate stock options 
(Collins et al. 2009).  In untabulated analyses I control for corporate governance characteristics by including 
composite governance metric (GOV_SCORE) proposed by Brown and Caylor (2006) in model (3).  Inclusion of the 
governance metric substantially reduces the sample size from 1,851 to 958 observations but it does not alter my 
principal findings. The coefficient on PROP_BACK continues to be positive and significant (8.943, p<0.05).  
27
 Notably, I do not use the instrumental variables (IV) approach because good instruments are very difficult to 
identify in most accounting research settings and absent such variables, the merits of the IV approach are 
questionable (e.g. Larcker and Rusticus 2010).  Rather, I select a dependent measure that enables me to credibly rule 
out competing explanations: as noted earlier, there are few, if any, explanations other than local knowledge transfers 
that would explain local concentration of backdating-related restatements.  
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this section, I report on several additional analyses designed to investigate the sensitivity of my 
finding to alternative specifications of the dependent and test variables.     
5.4.1 Alternate measures of local supply of expertise 
 Many studies in economic geography prefer to measure the availability of expertise using 
relative size metrics such as location quotients, computed as the ratio of an industry’s share of 
local employment to its share of national employment (Glaeser et al. 1992).  Table 8 reports the 
results of re-estimating model (1) by auditor type after replacing the absolute measure of the 
local supply of industry expertise (LHQ) used in Table 4 by the rank of the corresponding 
location quotient (RLQ).28  For consistency, I also substitute the analogous relative measure of 
the supply of accounting expertise (RACCY) for its absolute counterpart (LACCY).  The most 
notable feature of the results reported in Table 8 is that once I control for auditor identity, both 
the local supply of industry expertise and local knowledge transfers impact auditee FRC. 
5.4.2 Alternate measures of abnormal accruals 
To assess the sensitivity of my results to alternate specifications of the dependent 
variable, I proceed as follows.  I first compute abnormal accruals as residuals from each of three 
alternative models proposed in the literature.  These are (1) the modified Jones model (Dechow 
et al. 1995), (2) Ball and Shivakumar model (Ball and Shivakumar 2006), and (3) the Dechow-
Dichev (Dechow and Dichev 2002) model as modified by McNichols (McNichols 2002).29  
Untabulated analyses reveal significant positive correlation between these three sets of abnormal 
accruals and the Jones model accruals used thus far, so I use principal component analysis to 
                                               
28
 I compute the location quotient for accounting services using the employment data while I compute the location 
quotients for the auditee industry headquarters using headquarters count in a location since I do not have access to 
headquarters employment data by industry.   
29
 Details on the computation of each model are provided in appendix two. 
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create a composite measure that captures the common information content of all four measures.30  
Table 9 reports the results of re-estimating model (1) using the composite measure.  Overall, the 
results reported in Table 9 also confirm the basic finding that once I control for auditor identity, 
both the local supply of industry expertise and local knowledge transfers affect auditee FRC.  
5.4.3 Additional analysis of non Big Four auditee FRC  
The non Big Four audit firms include four firms, Grant Thornton LLP, BDO Seidman 
LLP, Crowe Chizek and Company LLC, and McGladrey and Pullen LLP (the Second Tier firms) 
that are each much larger than the other non Big Four firms.  In untabulated analyses conducted 
separately for these two subgroups I find that (1) Second Tier auditee FRC (N=400) is unaffected 
by, while smaller non Big Four auditee FRC (N=547) increases with local availability of industry 
expertise and (2) FRC for both groups is unaffected by local knowledge transfers.  Using the 
composite score as the dependent measure, I find auditee FRC for both groups to vary with local 
availability of industry expertise and to be unaffected by local knowledge transfers.  Overall, 
these findings indicate that the impact of geography on Second Tier auditee FRC is about the 
same as that for smaller non Big Four auditees. 
                                               
30
 In the principal component analysis the first component extracted has an eigenvalue of 3.16 and explains over 
79% of the total variation.  The second component extracted has an eigenvalue of 0.72 and explains 18% of the 
variation.  These results support the proposition that the information in these four measures of abnormal accruals 
effectively can be reduced to a single component.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
I investigate the impact of geography on a key attribute of corporate financial reporting, 
financial reporting consistency (FRC).  I predict and document that this impact is conditional on 
auditor type and that compared to the non Big Four auditors, Big Four auditors are both better 
able to compensate for local availability of expertise and to absorb local knowledge transfers that 
result naturally from the spatial agglomeration of experts.  Using stock option backdating-related 
restatements as an ex-post indicator of the adoption of inappropriate accounting practices, I 
further document the potential downside of local knowledge transfers.   
  My study is subject to certain limitations.  First, absent data on MSA-level employee 
head counts by industry I use MSA-level industry headquarter counts to measures the local 
availability of industry-specific expertise.  Second, although my findings with respect to the 
localized diffusion of backdating provides some reassurance in this respect, the degree to which 
my analyses satisfactorily distinguish between preparer and auditor influences on financial 
statements remains an open question.  Future research that relaxes these limitations would be 
valuable as would studies of settings that do not involve a significant role for preparers (e.g. 
income decreasing misstatements), thereby better isolating the effects of local knowledge 
transfers among auditors.  Other promising lines of inquiry include research on the links between 
local variations in corporate FRC and corporate cost of capital or the co-movement of stock 
returns of neighboring companies documented in Pirinsky and Wang (2006).   
Overall, my findings should be of widespread interest.  It could be beneficial for future 
research on determinants of CFR to account for the location effects I document.  The superior 
ability of Big Four auditors to orchestrate organizational arrangements that compensate for the 
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effects of spatial dispersion of experts I document as well as my finding that local knowledge 
transfers can abet the diffusion of inappropriate accounting practices should be of interest to 
policy-makers, regulators, audit market participants and financial statement users engaged in the 
ongoing debate on the role of the large audit firms. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Sample Selection 
    
The merged Compustat-Compact Disclosure-Audit Analytics sample of companies headquartered 
in United States for the Compustat fiscal years 2003 to 2005, both inclusive 13,252 
Less:  
1. Observations that do not have all the necessary data 6,380 
2. Observations pertaining to  financial (SIC 6000-6999, both inclusive) and regulated (SIC 4000-
4999, both inclusive) industries 712 
3. Observations where the company and auditor are not collocated 1,357 
Number of observations used in the analyses  4,803 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The sample consists of all observations, for fiscal years 2003 to 2005 (both inclusive), with necessary data 
and subject to the following restrictions (1) the company is headquartered in the United States, (2) the 
company and its auditors are both located in the same MSA and, (3) the company does not belong to the 
regulated (SIC 4000-4999) or financial (6000-6999) industries. Table 1 provides details on sample 
selection. Appendix B provides definitions and computations of all variables. 
         
VARIABLE N   MEAN      S.D.    MIN 25% MEDIAN 75%   MAX 
ABS_ACC 4,803 0.07 0.09 0 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.80 
MEAN_ACC 4,803 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.32 
MSA_SZ 4,803 2,500,000 2,200,000 47,680 870,000 1,900,000 2,400,000 7,400,000 
LMSA 4,803 14.35 0.9 10.77 13.67 14.47 14.68 15.81 
IND 4,803 15.80 20.08 1 2 6 22 79 
LIND 4,803 1.92 1.35 0 0.69 1.79 3.09 4.37 
ACCY 4,803 42,207 60,505 375 8,130 17,500 37,500 260,000 
LACCY 4,803 9.91 1.19 5.93 9 9.77 10.53 12.48 
LDIST 4,803 4.01 1.25 2.39 2.91 3.46 5.42 7.78 
HHI_MSA 4,803 0.30 0.11 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.31 1.00 
BIG 4,803 0.80 0.40 0 1 1 1 1 
LFEE_SZ 4,803 16.65 1.95 9.68 15.60 17.13 18.06 20.20 
INFL 4,803 0.10 0.19 0 0.01 0.03 0.09 1 
AUD_NEW 4,803 0.27 0.45 0 0 0 1 1 
MSA_LEAD 4,803 0.38 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 
NEW 4,803 0.01 0.08 0 0 0 0 1 
MSA_NEW 4,803 0.03 0.18 0 0 0 0 1 
LAT 4,803 38.09 4.82 21.31 33.96 39.68 41.51 61.19 
CH_SALE 4,803 0.14 0.53 -3.19 0.01 0.08 0.21 19.94 
LOSS 4,803 0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 
LEV 4,803 0.54 0.59 0.03 0.28 0.48 0.64 13.59 
CFO 4,803 0.05 0.25 -3.67 0.01 0.08 0.15 4.82 
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Table 3 
Correlation Table 
Pair-wise correlations for all continuous variables used in estimating model (1). Spearman correlations are above and Pearson correlation are 
below diagonal with p–values in square brackets. See Appendix two for variable definitions. See table 1 for sample selection criteria. 
 
 ABS_ACC LMSA_SZ LHQ LACCY LDIST HHI_MSA INFL LFE_SZ LAT CH_SALE LEV CFO 
ABS_ACC  0.031 0.1 0.025 -0.024 -0.036 -0.011 -0.142 -0.027 0.014 0.026 -0.24 
  [0.03] [0.00] [0.08] [0.10] [0.01] [0.43] [0.00] [0.06] [0.35] [0.08] [0.00] 
LMSA_SZ 0.017  0.437 0.924 -0.592 -0.617 -0.247 0.299 0.059 -0.006 -0.031 -0.059 
 [0.23]  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.70] [0.03] [0.00] 
LHQ 0.091 0.451  0.402 -0.36 -0.268 -0.22 0.234 0.011 -0.06 -0.179 -0.066 
 [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.44] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
LACCY 0.02 0.935 0.4  -0.562 -0.699 -0.204 0.237 0.002 -0.009 -0.029 -0.051 
 [0.17] [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.87] [0.52] [0.04] [0.00] 
LDIST -0.036 -0.571 -0.407 -0.539  0.282 0.226 -0.265 -0.082 0.063 0.034 0.083 
 [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] 
HHI_MSA -0.01 -0.614 -0.305 -0.584 0.281  0.098 -0.103 0.184 0.01 0.045 0.014 
 [0.48] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.49] [0.00] [0.34] 
INFL 0.068 -0.167 -0.142 -0.134 0.096 0.222  -0.671 -0.112 0.007 0.188 0.027 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] [0.65] [0.00] [0.06] 
LFEE_SZ -0.196 0.228 0.173 0.165 -0.175 -0.188 -0.631  0.092 0.037 0.005 0.096 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] [0.01] [0.72] [0.00] 
LAT -0.008 0.031 0.03 -0.014 -0.022 0.12 -0.066 0.085  -0.007 -0.027 -0.051 
 [0.57] [0.03] [0.03] [0.32] [0.12] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]  [0.63] [0.06] [0.00] 
CH_SALE 0.031 0.015 -0.03 0.017 0.011 -0.01 -0.012 -0.01 -0.038  -0.047 0.313 
 [0.03] [0.29] [0.04] [0.23] [0.45] [0.48] [0.41] [0.50] [0.01]  [0.00] [0.00] 
LEV 0.219 -0.022 -0.048 -0.02 0.017 0.028 0.083 -0.131 -0.042 -0.061  -0.134 
 [0.00] [0.12] [0.00] [0.16] [0.23] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]  [0.00] 
CFO -0.256 -0.054 -0.091 -0.047 0.065 0.027 0.004 0.115 -0.013 0.053 -0.21  
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06] [0.79] [0.00] [0.38] [0.00] [0.00]  
 35 
Table 4 
Regression of Absolute Value of Performance Adjusted Jones Model Abnormal Accruals on 
Location Characteristics and Control Variables by Auditor Type 
 
The sample consists of all observations, for fiscal years 2003 to 2005 (both inclusive), with necessary data 
and subject to the following restrictions (1) the company is headquartered in the United States, (2) the 
company and its auditors are both located in the same MSA (3) the company does not belong to the 
regulated (SIC 4000-4999) or financial (6000-6999) industries. Table 1 provides details on sample 
selection. The dependent variable is the absolute value of performance adjusted Jones model abnormal 
accruals. The model is estimated with both industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
by MSA. Appendix B provides definitions and computations of all variables. 
                
  Big Four Auditees Non Big Four Auditees 
Variable & 
Predicted Sign  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
  Coefficient t-value   Coefficient t-value   
Test Variables 
   
 
  
 
LHQ - 0.001 0.51  -0.015 -1.98 ** 
MEAN_ACC + 0.121 2.17 ** -0.162 -0.87  
Control Variables        
LMSA - 0.005 0.90  0.000 0.00  
LACCY - 
-0.002 -0.67  -0.002 -0.27  
LDIST + 0.002 1.77 ** -0.006 -1.20  
HHI_MSA - 0.003 0.25  0.093 1.39  
LFEE_SZ - 
-0.003 -1.84 ** -0.003 -0.72  
INFL - 
-0.020 -1.68 ** -0.011 -0.56  
AUD_NEW + 0.003 0.99  0.007 0.86  
MSA_LEAD - 0.001 0.24  -0.042 -2.27 ** 
NEW + 
-0.010 -0.48  0.054 1.27 * 
MSA_NEW + 0.017 1.56 * -0.020 -0.63  
LAT - 0.000 0.31  0.000 0.11  
CH_SALE + 0.030 3.96 *** 0.002 0.37  
LOSS + 0.024 3.94 *** 0.046 4.18 *** 
LEV + 0.020 2.48 *** 0.025 3.94 *** 
CFO - 
-0.070 -3.24 *** -0.030 -1.04  
CONSTANT ? 0.027 0.71  0.173 0.98  
N  3,856   947   
Clusters  80   63   
Adjusted R2   0.11     0.15     
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels for one-tailed tests when                                              
the expected  sign is determinate and for two-tailed tests otherwise. 
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Table 5 
Industry Distribution of Companies Involved in Stock Options Backdating 
(Fiscal Year 2005) 
          
2-Digit  
SIC Code Industry Description Frequency  Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
73 Business Services 35 24.48 24.48 
36 Electrical and Electronic Equipment 29 20.28 44.76 
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 16 11.19 55.94 
38 Instruments and Related Products 10 6.99 62.94 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 9 6.29 69.23 
48 Communications 9 6.29 75.52 
50 Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 4 2.8 78.32 
87 Engineering and Management Services 4 2.8 81.12 
58 Eating and Drinking Places 3 2.1 83.22 
63 Insurance Carriers 3 2.1 85.31 
20 Food and Kindred Product 2 1.4 86.71 
37 Transportation Equipment 2 1.4 88.11 
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 2 1.4 89.51 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 2 1.4 90.91 
67 Holding and Other Investment Offices 2 1.4 92.31 
15 General Building Contractors 1 0.7 93.01 
23 Apparel and Other Textile Products 1 0.7 93.71 
27 Printing and Publishing 1 0.7 94.41 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 1 0.7 95.1 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 1 0.7 95.8 
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 1 0.7 96.5 
54 Food Stores 1 0.7 97.2 
62 Security, Commodity Brokers and Services 1 0.7 97.9 
64 Insurance Agents, Brokers and Services 1 0.7 98.6 
80 Health Services 1 0.7 99.3 
82 Educational Services 1 0.7 100 
 Total 143 100  
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Table 6 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) Distribution of Companies Involved in Stock Options Backdating 
(MSAs with three or more Backdating Companies – Fiscal Year 2005) 
                  
 Backdaters All Headquarters SIC 36 Headquarters SIC 73 Headquarters 
MSA TITLE Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
SAN JOSE-SUNNYVALE-SANTA CLARA, CA 33 23.08 240 3.45 79 17.14 46 6.00 
LOS ANGELES-LONG BEACH-SANTA ANA, CA 17 11.89 410 5.90 28 6.07 61 7.95 
NEW YORK-NORTHERN NEW JERSEY-LONG ISLAND, NY-NJ 13 9.09 814 11.72 39 8.46 103 13.43 
BOSTON-CAMBRIDGE-QUINCY, MA-NH 12 8.39 287 4.13 22 4.77 52 6.78 
SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND-FREMONT, CA 11 7.69 243 3.50 19 4.12 57 7.43 
DALLAS-FORT WORTH-ARLINGTON, TX 6 4.20 254 3.66 15 3.25 30 3.91 
WASHINGTON-ARLINGTON-ALEXANDRIA, DC-VA- 5 3.50 183 2.63 5 1.08 31 4.04 
HOUSTON-SUGAR LAND-BAYTOWN, TX 4 2.80 257 3.70 5 1.08 14 1.83 
PHOENIX-MESA-SCOTTSDALE, AZ 3 2.10 84 1.21 15 3.25 11 1.43 
MIAMI-FORT LAUDERDALE-POMPANO BEACH, FL 3 2.10 168 2.42 11 2.39 23 3.00 
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Table 7 
Conditional Logistic Regression of Backdating Probability on Location Characteristic and Control 
Variables  
The sample consists of all observations, for fiscal year 2005, with necessary data and subject to the 
following restrictions (1) the company is headquartered in the United States, (2) the company and its 
auditors are both located in the same MSA. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the 
value 1 if the company is involved in backdating and 0 otherwise. The model is estimated with industry 
fixed effects. Standard errors are robust standard errors clustered by industry. Appendix B provides 
definitions and computations of all variables.  
          
  Model 1 
Variable &  
Predicted Sign  
 (1) (2)  
  Coefficient  z-value   
Test Variable     
PROP_BACK + 6.506 1.94 ** 
Control Variables 
 
  
 
LHQ ? 0.221 0.90  
LMSA ? -0.566 -1.14  
LACCY ? 0.338 1.16  
LDIST + -0.071 -0.47  
HHI_MSA - -0.916 -0.59  
BIG - 1.063 1.28  
LFEE_SZ - 0.109 0.62  
INFL - 0.870 1.17  
LAT - -0.043 -1.51 * 
CH_SALE + -0.136 -0.54  
LEV - -0.119 -0.34  
CFO 
- 
1.423 1.64 * 
N  1,845   
Pseudo R2 
 
          0.09 
 
 
                                *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels for one-tailed  
                                      tests when the expected  sign is determinate and for two-tailed tests otherwise.                        
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Table 8 
Regression of Absolute Value of Performance Adjusted Jones Model Abnormal Accruals on 
Location Characteristics (computed using relative presence matrices) and Control Variables  
 
The sample consists of all observations, for fiscal years 2003 to 2005 (both inclusive), with necessary data 
and subject to the following restrictions (1) the company is headquartered in the United States, (2) the 
company and its auditors are both located in the same MSA (3) the company does not belong to the 
regulated (SIC 4000-4999) or financial (6000-6999) industries. Table 1 provides details on sample 
selection. The dependent variable is the absolute value of performance adjusted Jones model abnormal 
accruals. The model is estimated with both industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
by MSA. Appendix B provides definitions and computations of all variables. 
                
  Big Four Auditees Non Big Four Auditees 
Variable & 
 Predicted Sign  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
  Coefficient t-value   Coefficient t-value   
Test Variables        
RHQ - 0.003 0.38  -0.073 -2.15 ** 
MEAN_ACC + 0.122 2.27 ** -0.168 -0.84  
Control Variables 
   
 
  
 
LMSA - 0.003 1.37  -0.018 -2.72 *** 
RACCY - 
-0.066 -1.00  0.039 0.17  
LDIST + 0.002 1.72 ** -0.004 -0.85  
HHI_MSA - 0.002 0.19  0.101 1.58  
LFEE_SZ - 
-0.003 -1.99 ** -0.003 -0.86  
INFL - 
-0.020 -1.69 ** -0.012 -0.63  
AUD_NEW + 0.003 0.99  0.007 0.82  
MSA_LEAD - 0.001 0.23  -0.041 -2.22 ** 
NEW + 
-0.010 -0.48  0.052 1.23  
MSA_NEW + 0.017 1.58 * -0.020 -0.63  
LAT - 0.000 0.42  0.000 0.06  
CH_SALE + 0.030 3.97 *** 0.002 0.43  
LOSS + 0.024 3.92 *** 0.045 4.22 *** 
LEV + 0.020 2.49 *** 0.025 3.89 *** 
CFO - 
-0.070 -3.25 *** -0.029 -1.02  
CONSTANT ? 0.029 0.96  0.393 2.85 *** 
N  3,856   947   
Clusters  80   63   
Adjusted R2   0.11     0.15     
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels for one-tailed tests when                                              
the expected  sign is determinate and for two-tailed tests otherwise. 
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Table 9 
Regression of Predicted Accruals (Principal Component) on Location Characteristics and Control 
Variables for the Full Sample and by Auditor Type 
 
The sample consists of all observations, for fiscal years 2003 to 2005 (both inclusive), with necessary data 
and subject to the following restrictions (1) the company is headquartered in the United States, (2) the 
company and its auditors are both located in the same MSA (3) the company does not belong to the 
regulated (SIC 4000-4999) or financial (6000-6999) industries. Table 1 provides details on sample 
selection. The dependent variable is the predicted accruals from the first component of a principal 
component analysis on four different abnormal accrual measures. The model is estimated with both 
industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by MSA. Appendix B provides definitions 
and computations of all variables including the different abnormal accruals.  
                
  Big Four Auditees Non Big Four Auditees 
Variable &  
Predicted Sign  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
  Coefficient  t-value   Coefficient  t-value   
Test Variables        
LHQ - 
-0.012 -0.55  -0.251 -2.05 ** 
MEAN_ACC + 0.099 1.63 * -0.145 -0.66  
Control Variables        
LMSA - 0.059 0.72  0.252 1.07  
LACCY - 0.011 0.23  -0.156 -1.03  
LDIST + 0.020 1.06  -0.049 -0.52  
HHI_MSA - 0.021 0.09  0.944 0.80  
LFEE_SZ - 
-0.068 -2.27 ** -0.081 -1.11  
INFL - -0.554 -2.67 *** -0.478 -1.34 * 
AUD_NEW + 0.055 0.86  0.155 1.24 * 
MSA_LEAD - 0.001 0.01  -0.667 -1.87 ** 
NEW + 
-0.004 -0.01  -0.494 -0.89  
MSA_NEW + 0.078 0.52  -0.150 -0.60  
LAT - 0.003 0.67  -0.007 -0.36  
CH_SALE + 0.656 3.66 *** 0.079 0.99  
LOSS + 0.513 4.44 *** 0.901 3.64 *** 
LEV + 0.463 4.45 *** 0.778 4.23 *** 
CFO - 
-1.151 -2.60 *** -0.365 -0.43  
CONSTANT ? 
-0.673 -1.07  -0.587 -0.20  
N  3,536   801   
Clusters  79   62   
Adjusted R2   0.12     0.15     
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels for one-tailed tests when                                              
the expected  sign is determinate and for two-tailed tests otherwise.
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APPENDIX A 
Data Sources 
 
No: Data  Source 
1 Company Financial 
Statement Data 
Compustat Fundamentals Annual database 
2 Auditor Location   Audit Analytics Audit Opinions dataset 
3 Audit Fees Audit Analytics Audit Fee dataset 
4 Headquarters 
location 
Compact Disclosure 
5  City Name to 
County Name Link 
SAS data file SASHELP.ZIPCODE 
National Association of Counties website http://www.naco.org/ 
6  MSA Definitions U.S. Census Bureau – Annual MSA definition files 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/metroareas/metrodef.html 
7 MSA Employment 
Data 
County Business Patterns, U.S. Census Bureau 
http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/download/index.htm 
8 MSA Latitude and 
Longitude 
SAS data file SASHELP.ZIPCODE. 
9 Stock option 
backdating  data 
Restatement database of Audit Analytics and Wall Street Journal list 
of companies likely to have backdated stock option 
10  Governance Scores Brown and Caylor corporate governance scores downloaded from 
http://robinson.gsu.edu/accountancy/gov_score.html 
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APPENDIX B 
Variable Definitions  
This appendix provides the definitions of the dependent and independent variables. The expected 
sign column displays the predicted sign of the relation between the dependent and independent 
variables and the reference column lists the prior literature on which the expected signs are 
based. For each variable I provide (within parentheses) the Compustat legacy version data item 
number followed by Compustat Xpressfeed data mnemonic. 
 
Variable Variable 
Type 
Exp. 
Sign 
Definition References/Justification 
ABS_ACC Dependent NA Abnormal accruals are computed as the absolute 
value of the residual from the following 
regression.  
TAit = β0 + β1 (1/ASSETit-1) + β2∆SALESit + 
β3PPEit + β4ROAit + εit 
Where 
Total accrual (TA) = Net Income (Compustat 
172, NI) less total cash flows (Compustat 308, 
OANCF) 
ASSET = total assets (Compustat#6, AT). 
 ∆SALES is the changes in net sales= 
(Compustat #12 SALE less lagged 
Compustat#12 SALE) 
 PPE is net property, plant and equipment 
(Compustat#8, PPENT)  
ROA is net income before extraordinary items 
(Compustat#18, IB)  
Each of these variables is scaled by lagged total 
assets. 
Jones (1991): Kothari et al 
(2005) 
LHQ Test - The natural logarithm of total number of 
headquarters in each 2-digit NAICS industry in 
each MSA 
NA 
MEAN_ACC Test + The mean absolute abnormal accrual for all 
companies located in the MSA excluding the 
company in question 
NA 
LMSA Test - The natural logarithm of the total MSA 
employment.  
NA 
LACCY Test - The natural logarithm of the total employment 
in NAICS 5412 in each MSA 
NA 
LDIST_SEC Control + The natural logarithm of the distance in miles 
from the MSA in which the company’s 
headquarters in located to the nearest SEC 
office. 
Kedia and Rajagopal 
(2009); DeFond et al. 
(2008) 
HHI_MSA Control - Is the Herfindahl index (a measure of market 
concentration) for the audit market at the MSA 
level. It is computed as ∑
=
N
i
is
1
2
 where si is the 
market share of firm i and N is the number of 
firms in the market. 
Kallapur et al.  (2009) 
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Appendix B (cont.)  
Variable Variable 
Type 
Exp. 
Sign 
Definition References/Justification 
BIG Control - Indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor is 
a Big Four Auditor, 0 otherwise 
Becker et al. (1998) 
NEW_AUD Control + An indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
auditor tenure is less than or equal to 3 
years, 0 otherwise 
Myers et al. (2003); 
 
LFEE_SZ Control - Natural logarithm of the size of an audit 
office. Size of audit office is computed as 
the total audit fees collected by that 
individual audit office in a year. 
Francis and Yu (2009) 
INFL Control - Computed as the ratio of the total fees paid 
by a company to the total fees earned by 
that audit office. 
 Reynolds and Francis (2000) 
MSA_LEAD Control - An indicator variable that takes the value 1, 
if the audit firm has the highest market 
share by audit fees at the MSA level in that 
2-digit NAICS code, 0 otherwise 
Fergusson et al (2003) 
Francis et al (2005) 
NEW Control + An indicator variable that takes the value 1 
if the company has been on Compustat for 
less than 4 years, 0 otherwise 
Anthony and Ramesh (1992) 
NEW_MSA Control + An indicator variable that takes the value 1 
if the company has located in an MSA for 
less than 4 years, 0 otherwise 
NA 
LAT Control - Natural Logarithm of AT (Date 6) Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
CH_SALE Control + Change in sale scaled by lagged total assets. 
Computed as (Compustat12, SALEt-
Compustat12t-1, SALE) / Compustat6t-1, AT 
McNichols (2000) 
LOSS Control + An indicator variable equal to 1 if net 
income (Compustat172, NI) is less than 0, 0 
otherwise 
DeAngelo et al. (1994); 
Burgstahler and  Dichev 
(1997) 
LEV Control + Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
(Compustat181, LT/Compustat6, AT) 
Becker (1998); DeFond and 
Jimbalvo (1994) 
CFO Control - Cash flow from operations deflated by 
lagged total assets (Compustat 308t, 
OANCF/Compustat 6 t-1, AT) 
Kothari et al. (2005) 
Stock Options Backdating  Model 
BACKDATE Dependent  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company 
backdates its employee stock options, 0 
otherwise 
 
PROP_BACK  Test + Proportion of companies that backdate stock 
options in a location excluding the company 
in question 
 
LHQ Test ? The natural logarithm of total number of 
headquarters in each 2-digit SIC industry in 
each MSA 
NA 
LMSA Test ? The natural logarithm of the total MSA 
employment.  
NA 
LACCY Test ? The natural logarithm of the total 
employment in NAICS 5412 in each MSA 
NA 
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Appendix B (cont.)  
Variable Variable 
Type 
Exp. 
Sign 
Definition References/Justification 
LDIST_SEC Control + The natural logarithm of the distance in miles 
from the MSA in which the company’s 
headquarters in located to the nearest SEC 
office. 
Kedia and Rajagopal 
(2009); DeFond et al. 
(2008) 
HHI_MSA Control - Is the Herfindahl index (a measure of market 
concentration) for the audit market at the MSA 
level. It is computed as ∑
=
N
i
is
1
2
 where si is the 
market share of firm i and N is the number of 
firms in the market 
Kallapur et al.  (2009) 
BIG Control - Indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a 
Big Four Auditor, 0 otherwise 
 
LFEE_SZ Control - Natural logarithm of the size of an audit office. 
Size of audit office is computed as the total audit 
fees collected by that individual audit office in a 
year. 
Francis and Yu (2009) 
INFL Control - Computed as the ratio of the total fees paid by a 
company to the total fees earned by that audit 
office. 
Reynolds and Francis 
(2000) 
LAT Control - Natural Logarithm of  total assets (Date 6, AT) Larger firms  may be less 
likely to adopt option 
backdating 
CH_SALE Control + Change in sale scaled by lagged total assets. 
Computed as (Compustat12t, SALE-
Compustat12t-1, SALE) / (Compustat6t-1, AT) 
Growth firms are more 
likely to have employee 
stock option plans.  
LEV Control - Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
(Compustat181, LT/Compustat6, AT) 
Highly levered firms may 
be more strictly monitored 
by their creditors reducing 
the likelihood of 
accounting manipulations.  
CFO Control - Cash flow from operations deflated by lagged 
total assets (Compustat 308t, 
OANCF/Compustat 6 t-1, AT) 
Companies with cash flow 
problems are more likely to 
use stock options. 
Alternate Accrual Models  
MOD_JONES Dependent NA Abnormal accruals are computed as the absolute 
value of the residual from the following 
regression.  
TAit = β0 + β1 (1/ASSETit-1) + β2(∆SALESit -
∆RECit )+ β3PPEit + β4ROAit + εit 
Where,  Total accrual (TA) = Net Income 
(Compustat 172, NI) less total cash flows 
(Compustat 308, OANCF). ASSET = total assets 
(Compustat#6, AT).  ∆SALES is the changes in 
net sales= (Compustat #12,SALE less lagged 
Compustat#12, SALE). ∆REC is the change in 
receivables =(Compustat#2, RECT less lagged 
Compustat#2, RECT).  PPE is net property, 
plant and equipment (Compustat#8, PPENT). 
ROA is net income before extraordinary items 
(Compustat#18, IB)  
Each variable is scaled by lagged total assets. 
Jones (1991); Dechow et 
al. (1995); Kothari et al 
(2005) 
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Appendix B (cont.)  
Variable Variable 
Type 
Exp. 
Sign 
Definition References/Justification 
BALL_SHIV Dependent NA Abnormal accruals are computed as the absolute 
value of the residual from the following 
regression.  
TAit = β0 + β1 (1/ASSETit-1) + β2(∆SALESit -
∆RECit )+ β3PPEit + β4CFOit +DUMit+ 
CFOit*DUMit + εit 
Where 
Total accrual (TA) = Net Income (Compustat 
172, NI) less total cash flows (Compustat 308, 
OANCF) 
ASSET = total assets (Compustat#6, AT). 
 ∆SALES is the changes in net sales= 
(Compustat #12, SALE less lagged 
Compustat#12, SALE) 
∆REC is the change in  receivables 
=(Compustat#2, RECT less lagged 
Compustat#2, RECT) 
 PPE is net property, plant and equipment 
(Compustat#8, PPENT)  
CFO is the cash flow from operations= 
(Compustat#308, OANCF) 
DUM is an indicator variable which is equal to 
1 if cash flow from operations is negative, 0 
otherwise  
Each of these variables is scaled by lagged total 
assets. 
Jones (1991); Kothari et al 
(2005); Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006) 
DD Dependent NA Abnormal accruals are computed as the absolute 
value of the residual from the following 
regression.  
CWCit = β0 + β1 CFO it-1 + β2CFO it + β3CFO it+1 
+ β4(∆SALESit)+ β5PPEit + εit 
Where 
CWC is the change in working capital accruals 
computed as increase in accounts receivable 
(Compustat#302, RECCH) +increase in 
inventory (Compustat#303, INVCH)+ decrease 
in accounts payable and accrued liabilities 
(Compustat#304, APALCH)+ decrease in taxes 
accrued (Compustat#305, TXACH)+increase 
(decrease) in other liabilities (Compustat#307, 
AOLOCH).CFO is net operating cash flows 
(Compustat#308, OANCF). ∆SALES is the 
changes in net sales= (Compustat #12, SALE 
less lagged Compustat#12, SALE). PPE is net 
property, plant and equipment (Compustat#8, 
PPENT). ROA is net income before 
extraordinary items (Compustat#18, IB)  
Each of these variables is scaled by average 
total assets. 
Dechow and Dichev (2002); 
McNichols (2002) 
 
